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Abstract Liberalist thinking argues that moral agents
have a right (or duty) to pursue an ordinary life. It also
insists that moral agent can be bystanders. A bystander is
involved with morally bad states of affairs in the sense that
they are bound by moral duty, but for a non-blameworthy
reason. A common view on the morality of commercial life
argues that commercial agents cannot and ought not to
assume the status of bystander, when confronted with child
labor, pollution, or other overwhelmingly big morally bad
states of affairs (oMBS). According to the common view,
the agent will get overdemanded. In this paper, the
overdemandingness charge is interpreted as a criticism of
the liberalist position. According to this charge, bystander
status must be given up in the market because otherwise the
right (or duty) to pursue a personal life is crushed. In this
paper, we demonstrate that the overdemandingness charge
fails. It does not make sense if bystander status is grounded
in the duty of beneficence. It would make sense if the status
were grounded in the duty of rescue but that duty does not
apply in relation to oMBS. The condition of ‘subjective
urgency’ is not fulfilled. Hence, liberalist thinking can
withstand the charge of overdemandingness and commer-
cial agents cannot assume a right never to acknowledge
bystander status (on account of the overdemandingness
argument).
Keywords Bystander  Beneficence  Rescue  Morally
bad states of affairs  Overdemandingness  Personal
morality  Subjective urgency
Introduction
Moral agents are often confronted with ‘morally bad states
of affairs’ (MBS). A MBS can formally be defined as a
situation that is objectionable, reprehensible, or even
intolerable from the moral point of view. MBS differ as
widely as the refugee problem differs from the victim of a
robbery. When a moral agent is a bystander to a MBS, what
is the basis for the actions they may have to perform on
account of duty: rescue or beneficence? In this paper, it is
argued that a proper understanding of the ground, helps
avoiding the charge that commercial agents cannot be
considered bystanders because that would create an
overdemandingness problem.
The concept ‘bystander’ is crucial to this paper. We
reserve the term for a moral agent who is—or becomes—
involved in a MBS in the sense that they are obliged by
moral duty but for a non-blameworthy reason (Dunfee
2006; Hill 2012; Radzik forthcoming). A standard example
of bystander involvement in the literature is when a person
happens to walk past a pond in which a person is drowning
(Kamm 2000, p. 656). In that urgent situation the non-
blameworthy, circumstantial fact of proximity to the
potential drowning transforms the non-involved passerby
into a bystander who is involved by duty.
The concept bystander—as we use it—only makes sense
when particular assumptions about morality are made. The
concept presupposes that it is meaningful to distinguish
between bad things we somehow ‘do to others’ (i.e., are to
blame for) and bad things that merely ‘happen to others.’
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We must be able to make a meaningful distinction between
‘wrong’ and ‘(merely) bad’ (Fried 1978). This presuppo-
sition only makes sense when it is assumed that moral
agents must also have concern for their own life plan;
either as a right (Miller 2004; Schmidtz 2000) or as an
(indirect) duty as well as a right (Kant 1797/1996). This
assumption is part of many moral traditions but it is
articulated in particular in the ‘liberalist tradition,’ as we
will refer to it. This tradition—on which we focus—as-
sumes that each moral agent has a right and a duty to
pursue a normal or ordinary life (Herman 2007; Rawls
1971). In the liberalist tradition, ‘wrong’ defines a rela-
tionship between the MBS and an agent in terms that
identify the latter as accountable and to blame. Child labor
and robberies should not exist. When they do, that is
wrong; meaning that at some level one or more moral
agents fail because of that fact. When something is ‘merely
bad’ the agent ought to regret it but they are not account-
able or blameworthy related to its coming about. A young
person dying of cancer may count as an example of the
latter. Typically, we do not hold anybody to blame for a
situation like that.
Yet, the concept ‘bystander’ also presupposes that the
agent who is not blameworthy involved as regards the rise
of the MBS, may (sometimes) still have duties toward
others who find themselves in MBS. The way they deal
with or relate to the situation may still be the cause of
moral failure (Frankena 1963/1973; Kant 1797/1996, vol.
VI, p. 452; Hill 2012; Herman 2007; Rawls 1971). If there
were no duties in relation to how the moral agent must
respond to a confrontation, they were always either
blameworthy involved in MBS or mere ‘outsiders.’ The
status of bystander and the specific problems related to
that status (i.e., overdemandingness) could not even arise.
(This is why we exclude the libertarian niche of liberalism
from our definition of the liberalist tradition. Libertarians
argue that it may be good or praiseworthy for the non-
blameworthy moral agent to have moral concern in situa-
tions in which the agent is confronted with a MBS but
there are never duties to acknowledge (Fried 1978; Nozick
1975).)
The concept ‘bystander’ further presupposes that we
take the personal (or micro) perspective in reflections on
moral duty. This perspective must be contrasted with the
political–ethical (or macro) point of view. When we take
the latter perspective, the line between ‘wrong’ and ‘bad’ is
drawn between what is wrong and merely bad from the
moral community point of view. What is wrong can for
example be concretized in terms of things ‘people owe
others’ (Scanlon 1998) or the idea of ‘duties of Right’
(Kant 1797/1996). We can thus categorize robbery as
unjust, while (unwanted) loneliness is merely bad. It is also
characteristic of the political–ethical perspective to
conceptualize morality in terms of realizing a situation.
Morality’s demands are not fully redeemed as long as all
agents do not have ‘what is owed to them.’ As long as there
is something that the community must identify as ‘wrong’
it cannot rest.
While taking the personal perspective, the moral agent
asks: how am I to relate to a situation I am confronted with,
regardless of the fact whether I can solve the issue (by
myself) and also regardless of the role others (communi-
ties, governments etc.) have to play? Although performing
tasks is also important in this perspective, the relational
aspect is paramount. From the personal perspective
morality requires the agent to relate to a MBS in a certain
way. Actions (doing things and performing tasks) are
important but saving one’s moral agency by relating to an
issue in a certain way is crucial. The distinction between
‘wrong’ and ‘merely bad’ remains meaningful in this per-
spective but the line between the two is drawn differently.
If I am confronted with a MBS while taking the personal
perspective, I only have to consider my relation to its
coming about as ‘wrong’ when my personal involvement in
this process makes me blameworthy; it is ‘merely bad’
when I am not so involved. When I see a robbed person
that I have not robbed, while I also neither have been an
accomplice to the culprit nor have benefitted from the
robbery, I confront a situation that is ‘merely bad’ to me.
Yet, if it turns out that I must consider myself a bystander, I
must acknowledge duties in my proper response.
What are the implications of having to assume the status
of bystander? If a moral agent must consider themselves
bystander, they cannot walk away indifferently anymore.
Their response is bound by duty and will involve sup-
portive action of some kind, even if that will not solve the
problem (as a whole). It has been argued that in a world in
which there are many and many enormous MBS moral
agents will get overdemanded because of their bystander
duties. Liberalist thinking is not fit for modern times, so to
speak, with its insistence that agents have a right to an
ordinary life and bystander duties at the same time. It must
grant moral agents a moral right to reject bystander status.
Otherwise, it cannot redeem its commitment to the prin-
ciple that each person has a right to an ordinary life. In this
paper, we investigate this claim.
We restrict the discussion on this claim to commercial
life. The idea that moral agents have a right to moral
indifference in relation to MBS they are non-blameworthy
related to in terms of its coming about, is part and parcel of
a common view on business morality. According to this
view, market morality must be a ‘minimum morality’
(Baumol 1975; Donaldson 1989; Elfstrom 1991; Homann
1994, 2008; see also Hsieh 2004). A defining aspect of this
minimum market morality (MMM) is the exclusion of all
the duties of the bystander.
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Kinds of Morally Bad States of Affairs
We restrict the investigation in several ways. We limit the
investigation about the claim to a special kind of MBS. It is
quite usual to distinguish between problems a person could
deal with (i.e., solve) on their own and problems that
require cooperation. The first we refer to as (normal) MBS
and the latter as collective MBS (cMBS). When a victim is
robbed, a passing-by moral agent who becomes a bystander
can fulfill all rescue duties by themselves. When a big
bushfire threatens to burn down 25 houses, one bystander
can only do so much. More bystanders are called for, and
they need to cooperate, plan, and so forth in order to fulfill
their bystander duties.
From the personal perspective it makes sense to distin-
guish between kinds of MBS in a different way, especially
if overdemandingness is the issue. This is the distinction
between (normal) MBS and—what we refer to as—over-
whelmingly big MBS (oMBS). Whereas the distinction
between MBS and cMBS relates to different properties of
the MBS, the distinction between MBS and oMBS refers to
the relation between the agent and the MBS. In case of an
oMBS, the agent finds themselves in a situation in which
they can rightfully claim that they are overwhelmed by the
MBS. This claim is not just a subjective psychological
feeling but a situation in which moral agents can legiti-
mately claim to be overwhelmed. It is clear that the agent
cannot deal with the situation on their own. The circum-
stances are even worse: in case of an oMBS anything that
would mean only the tiniest bit in terms of solving the
problem, immediately threatens the right to pursue an
ordinary life. At the same time, the agent can rightfully
claim in relation to an oMBS that anything they can do that
is still in line with their right to have an ordinary life, is
meaningless, if solving the problem is the only thing that
counts. That is why oMBS sometimes come with the
psychological feeling that one might as well do nothing.
Doing something has an element of absurdity. Why bother
about saving one person if the life of a million people are at
risk? (This psychological feeling is mistaken exactly
because it overlooks the personal perspective, but that is
another matter).
Since oMBS are defined by a relation, they do not exist
in the way cMBS exist: as a specific kind of problem with
specific properties. As soon as a cMBS becomes big
enough, it may turn into an oMBS. If a bushfire gets really
big, it may overwhelm the bystander. Still, especially in
relation to the discussion on the bystander in commercial
life, the typical oMBS is a global problem, like child labor,
structural and large-scale poverty, an epidemic disease
(i.e., AIDS), the refugee problem, or the dramatic extinc-
tion of natural life. These typical oMBS have a special
characteristic: they only exist in reflection, in the sense that
a moral agent cannot point at these problems in real life.
They can only point at a symbolic instantiation*- or a token
of the problem. When a person accidently drowns in a pool,
there is a sense in which we can say that the bystander can
really ‘see’ and point at the problem in the empirical world
(even if many philosophers will emphasize that this process
of ‘seeing’ already requires interpretation of reality). This
idea of pointing at ‘the problem’ is already more difficult—
and different—with medium-sized cMBS. If we want to
point at ‘the problem’ we can point at one burning house.
But if so, we are either pointing at a part of the problem or
something that functions as a symbol or token for the
problem as such. In the case of an exemplary oMBS, we
can no longer point at a specific case as ‘the problem,’ not
even as a part. The problem as such is only accessible
through its instantiations and (some) individual cases
symbolically function as instantiations. One particular
picture of Aylan Kurbani (the dead 3-year-old washed
ashore on the Turkish beach, September 2015) represents
the refugee crisis of 2015. His tragic death is too small an
event to function as ‘a part’ of the problem. Yet, the picture
taken at the Turkish beach represents the refugee crisis as
such. Exactly because of that fact, individual moral agents
experience to be overwhelmed by such a problem—and
have a right to that experience.
In this paper we focus on oMBS, in particular the
exemplary oMBS that provoke the experience of being
overwhelmed because of the way we (must) think them.
The proposition we defend is that if liberalist thinking does
not have an overdemandingness problem in relation to
these exemplary oMBS, it does not have an overdemand-
ingness problem at all.
The second restriction of the paper is that we will only
investigate the possible ground of obligation in relation to
an oMBS. We do not investigate what bystanders must do
in terms of (concrete) actions. When a moral agent
becomes a bystander, it is natural to think that they must do
things. They must ‘help,’ ‘rescue,’ or at least must be
considered to have an obligation to consider these actions.
The paper does not go into the content of these actions. It is
a formal exercise into the possible grounds of obligation,
when a person is a bystander. Even more precise: we
investigate what the bystander ought to consider the
specific ground of obligation when confronted with an
oMBS. We evaluate two possible duties that could serve as
possible grounds of obligation: the duty of beneficence and
the duty of rescue. (Please note that we must distinguish
between actions that can be described as ‘‘helping’’ or
‘‘rescuing’’ and the grounds of obligation ‘beneficence’ and
‘rescue.’ Many actions can be described as ‘helping’ and
these actions can have all manner of grounds, e.g., a paid
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plumber may be said to ‘‘help us’’ with a leaking tap. We
are only interested in actions originating in beneficence and
rescue as ground. As such the duty of beneficence may lead
to actions that can be described as ‘rescuing’).
The need to differentiate between the two grounds often
goes unrecognized. Miller (2004) uses duty of ‘rescue,’
duty of ‘beneficence,’ and even duty of ‘aid’ interchange-
ably as grounds for people to provide aid or perform res-
cuing activities (See also Kamm 2000; Schmidtz 2000;
Soule et al. 2009). What is more, in so far as the distinction
is made, there is a tendency to think that the duty of rescue
is the natural—or only possible—ground of obligation for
the bystander in relation to oMBS (Dunfee 2006; see also
Scanlon 1998).
By contrast, we will argue that when confronted with an
oMBS, the ground of obligation must be the duty of
beneficence. If that duty is the ground of obligation there
cannot be an overdemandingness problem. We will also
argue that liberalist thinking cannot allow the duty of res-
cue to be the proper ground in relation to oMBS. If so, it
cannot foreclose the overdemandingness problem. It fails
as a normative theory. It can no longer reconcile bystander
duties in relation to oMBS and moral agent’ right (i.e.,
duty) to pursue their own life. Hence, in that case it must
grant moral agents a moral right to never to acknowledge
bystander duties when confronted with oMBS.
The third restriction of the paper is that we limit our
investigation to the issue: if a moral agent has the status of
bystander, what follows?1 Given this third restriction some
worries and concerns do not apply to the paper. Some
people ask themselves how a moral agent becomes a
bystander. When and how do moral agents transform from
an ‘outsider’ to a ‘bystander’? What are legitimate criteria,
and so forth. Given our restriction we pass by all these
issues. We only need to make one formal point about the
transformation process. It concerns the concept ‘being
well-placed.’ It seems that common morality makes the
status of bystander depend on a complex array of signifi-
cant symbolic facts. Examples of such symbolic significant
facts include (literal or symbolic) proximity to a problem,
expertise, social relatedness, and an existing relationship
with a victim or a perpetrator of injustice. For example: in
the most obvious case of a person drowning, literal prox-
imity to the pond transforms an agent into a bystander. The
symbolic facts have in common that the bystander is
somehow specially related to the MBS. Good swimmers
will become bystanders, when someone is drowning, all
things considered equal. By the same token, a doctor
acquires the status when they are present in a movie theater
while someone gets a heart attack. We refer to this con-
dition as ‘being well-placed.’ We use this as a purely
formal term. When an agent is well placed, morally
speaking, it goes by definition that they stand out among
other moral agents and this outstanding position transforms
them into a bystander (all things considered equal).
As a consequence of the third restriction, we can also
pass by the question whether organizations can be
bystanders. People raise this issue because the moral status
of the organization is disputed in today’s moral discus-
sions. This issue is especially debated in commercial life,
as many market agents are organizations. We can simply
relate to this discussion by saying: if organizations can be
full-fledged moral agents, they can also be bystanders. If
they cannot be moral agents at all, they also cannot be
bystanders. If they can be moral agents of some kind, it
depends on the exact way human beings think they can and
have a right to impute moral duties on them. An important
reason for being unconcerned about the issue is that this
paper’s main aim is to object to a view that states that
agents on the market have a right to moral indifference,
because of the overdemandingness problem. The authors
who make that claim also do not make this consideration
relevant to their argument. In their view, overdemanding-
ness would also be a problem in a market without corpo-
rations. At a minimum, our argument also relates to such a
world.
We proceed to explain the overdemandingness problem
(‘‘Market Morality and Overdemandingsness’’ section).
Subsequently, we demonstrate why grounding bystander
involvement in relation to oMBS on the duty of benefi-
cence does not lead to the problem of overdemandingness
(‘‘The Duty of Beneficence and Its Structure’’ section).
Then, we argue why the duty of rescue fails as a ground for
bystander involvement in relation to oMBS (‘‘The Duty of
Rescue,’’ ‘‘The Duty of Rescue and oMBS,’’ ‘‘Subjective
Urgency’’ sections). In the last section, we demonstrate
why and how beneficence is not a ‘weak’ and therefore
meaningless duty in relation to oMBS (‘‘Beneficence as a
Meaningful Duty’’ section).
Market Morality and Overdemandingness
In thinking about the morality of the market, a common
view holds that commercial agents can never assume the
status of bystander. Some argue that the nature of com-
mercial life or the role commercial agents have to play, per
definition contradicts with the idea of a bystander
(Habermas 1981; Luhmann 1988; Weber 1921/1972).
1 Pogge (2002) has argued that people in affluent societies argue way
too quickly that they are mere bystanders to MBS elsewhere on the
planet. More often than we think, we actually are blameworthy
involved in MBS. This paper does not necessarily conflict with this
position. It merely asks: if there are some cases in which the moral




Others simply hold that the status of bystander does not
exist (Nozick 1975).
A third group has a different kind of argument to reject
the possibility of the status having relevance in commercial
life. Acknowledging the relevance and possibility of
bystander status in commercial life would lead to immoral
situations and practical contradictions, (Donaldson 1989;
Donaldson and Dunfee 1999; Homann 2008; U.N. 2008).
Commercial agents would immediately be ruined if they
were morally obliged to accept bystander status. They
would be overdemanded. Commercial agents must be
protected from this and hence be given a right to moral
indifference. Although protagonists of the argument usu-
ally do not put it that way, the overdemandingness problem
can be interpreted as a criticism of liberalist thought. The
criticism points out that given modern conditions, liberalist
thinking can no longer reconcile the moral agent’s right (or
duty) to pursue their own life with bystander duties. It must
therefore accommodate to modern circumstances and give
up bystander duties (in commercial life).
The key to this argument is the concept of overde-
mandingness. Overdemandingness arises if the moral
requirements that the agent must acknowledge place the
same agent in a situation in which they are no longer able
to fulfill other moral duties or take care of their own
legitimate concerns (See Bosma 2012; Van den Hoven
2006; also see Goodin 2009; Herman 2007). We limit the
overdemandingness problem to the (exemplary) oMBS. If
the overdemandingness argument makes sense at all, it
must make sense in relation to oMBS. Naturally, there is an
obverse to this thesis: if it can be shown that the overde-
mandingness problem does not make sense in relation to
oMBS, it does not make sense at all.
Before we criticize the overdemandingness argument,
we will formulate it as strong as possible. We do this by
rebutting some of the (natural) objections, raised against
the very idea. An objection that may arise against the
concept is that morality cannot rule out the possibility that
the demands of morality are steep. If your parents fall ill
and you have to take care of them your life may be seri-
ously uprooted for a long time (assuming that in an indi-
vidualist culture these activities are considered as
‘‘uprooting your life’’). Morality does not give you a break
here merely because this obligation is steep. This objection
misfires. It overlooks that the overdemandingness argu-
ment interprets the concept as a moral term. It refers to
situations in which a moral agent has a legitimate moral
right (or even a duty) to claim that too much is being
demanded of them. Within the liberalist tradition this
possibility must be taken into account since moral agents
also have a right (or duty) to have concern for their own
life. In case of (moral) overdemandingness, it is immoral
and contradictory still to demand the action. A ‘‘desert
island’’ example is when an individual’s life is eaten up by
a constant stream of total strangers they need to rescue,
while trying to build a small house for their spouse and
children.
Another objection that naturally arises is that some
people will subjectively consider themselves overde-
manded much sooner than others. A greedy agent may
consider themself overdemanded by having to donate just a
little bit of money to the worldly poor. Are these people
sooner ‘‘off the hook’’? Not really; the objection overlooks
that overdemandingness is a moral term. It refers to a sit-
uation that a moral agent may find themselves in. The
definition of the situation is based on (intersubjectively
shared) rational arguments, not subjective considerations.
It is the same as with killing a person out of self-defense.
Situations in which an agent can claim the right to self-
defense are not based on subjective evaluations of the sit-
uation but on (shared) rational arguments determining
whether an agent is in that situation. The same rebuttal
applies to the closely related objection that some people
feel overdemanded much quicker than others. Again, the
argument does not interpret overdemandingness as a psy-
chological condition. It refers to a moral condition moral
agents may find themselves in.
It has also been objected to the concept of overde-
mandingness that it has paradoxical and immoral effects. It
seems to stimulate agents to diminish their capacity to deal
with moral problems. The sooner you can claim to be
overdemanded, the sooner you are off the hook, morally
speaking. The arguments mentioned above can be used
against this objection also, but additional things need to be
pointed out as well. The objection overlooks that overde-
mandingness is a moral problem that stands in need of
reflection in liberalist moral community. That some of the
arguments of this moral reflection will (later) be used by
non-moral agents as bad excuses to get away with their
behavior is saddening but beside the point. In so far as an
agent is a moral agent, it is contradictory for them to use
these excuses. It also needs to be added that the objection
seems to look at overdemandingness as an argument to be
used in ‘applied ethics’ or ‘moral case analyses,’ in which
agents may be looking at reasons (or excuses) to diminish
their personal involvement. The reflection on the concept
of overdemandingness as pursued here, takes place at a
different level of moral reasoning. It only makes sense at
the reflective level at which moral agents determine what
must be considered the proper set of duties that moral
agents must acknowledge in life (i.e., when confronted
with real cases). At that level of reflection, the liberalist
conception cannot dismiss the concept of overdemanding-
ness, given its adherence to the idea that each agent has a
right (and a duty) to have concern for their own life. At this
level, liberalist thinking must come up with a set of duties
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that foreclose the possibility of overdemandingness,
otherwise moral agents cannot reasonably apply morality
to cases.
In line with this, it may be instructive to distinguish
between the formal concept and the material concept. As a
formal concept, ‘overdemandingness’ can be interpreted as
referring to the situation in which the set of (concrete)
duties will by definition badger the possibility that the
moral agent can have sufficient concern for their own life.
From a liberalist perspective, allowing for the possibility of
overdemandingness as a formal concept is necessary, given
the concern it has for the right (or duty) each moral agent
ought to have for their own life. Liberalist thought would
be immoral if it ignored the necessity of coining the formal
concept. It would also be contradictory given the need for
the personal perspective on morality. The personal per-
spective only makes sense if the ‘I’ perspective is to be
taken seriously. Overdemandingness destroys the personal
perspective. By definition, it depicts the situation in which
moral agents have become the plaything of uncontrollable
events. (Please note that even a radical utilitarian like
Singer (1972) allows for the formal concept. He insists that
at some point, the moral agent may take into account their
concern for self. In the end, Singer is not a radical altru-
ist.)2 In order to determine when and how an agent is
overdemanded in real life, it is necessary to draw up con-
crete, empirically verifiable criteria. In doing so, the con-
cept gets a material content. The ‘overdemandingness
argument’ refuting bystander status in commercial life
states that any set of material criteria will imply formal
overdemandingness, in a world of scarcity and many
oMBS. That is why all duties that lead to this status must
be eliminated from the set of duties, relevant for com-
mercial agents. We aim to show that liberalist thinking can
reconcile the individual’s right to an ordinary life and
bystander status, even in today’s world with its many
oMBS.
The Duty of Beneficence and Its Structure
The most important duties of the bystander are beneficence
and rescue. In this section, we focus on the duty of
beneficence. We intend to show that the overdemanding-
ness argument does not make sense if the bystander duties
in relation to oMBS are grounded on the duty of benefi-
cence. Within liberalist thought the duty is encased within
(self-)restricting mechanisms foreclosing the possibility.
According to Frankena (1963/1973, p. 45), the duty of
beneficence is the duty to ‘do good and prevent harm.’
Kant (1797/1996, vol. VI, p. 452) completes this by stating
that beneficence is not just wishing well. It is ‘active
practical benevolence, making the well-being and the
happiness of others one’s end.’
An initial step in the process of making beneficence
compatible with the right to pursue an ordinary life, is the
liberalist idea that the duty must be formulated as a non-
maximizing principle: it is (only) wrong for a moral agent
to live their life without ever helping others. However, in a
world in which MBS are all around us, that does not suf-
ficiently protect the right to an ordinary life. In the liberalist
tradition, the duty of beneficence is therefore given a
special structure foreclosing the possibility of overde-
mandingness ever arising. The idea that the duty of
beneficence must have a special structure if it is to be
compatible with a morality that also acknowledges a moral
agent’s right or duty to pursue their own ends, was worked
out in a centuries’ long (European) tradition of moral
thinking, starting in Early Modern thought or even before
that time (Schneewind 1998). Here, we follow Kant’s
version of this old European tradition, as the Kantian tra-
dition has kept on to this quite well (Kant 1785/2002, 1797/
1996; see also Hill 1971, 2002; Herman 1998; Rawls and
Herman 2000; Wood 1999)3
In the Kantian taxonomy of duties, some are conceptu-
alized as directly related to (the omission of) action. Typ-
ical duties like ‘do not steal’ and ‘do not murder’ do indeed
have this structure. According to Kant this is meaningful,
because morality is—at least in part—owed to others and
meant to protect their freedom. In so far as morality is
owed to others, morality directly concerns omitting or
performing certain actions. Kant refers to duties having this
structure as perfect duties (Kant 1785, IV: 421).
However, as many others in the European tradition,
Kant argues that our duties to others are not exhausted by
the protection of their freedom. Kant grounds this idea on
the principle of autonomy but that is not important here.
Important is that, he had to find a conceptual way of
making it possible to think that we may have duties as
bystander, without these duties immediately overdemand-
ing the moral agent, given that there is so much bad in the
2 Please note that Singer (1972) only criticizes the liberalist position
in terms of the material criteria it draws up to determine overde-
mandingness. Many will argue that his radical position on the
material criteria place him at the margin of the liberalist position—or
even beyond that point.
3 Schneewind (1998) points out that Kant uses familiar terms and
familiar distinctions but sometimes changes the use of well-
established terms in his own idiosyncratic ways. What is more,
students of the Kantian moral taxonomy have noted that many of
Kant’s terms are underdetermined (Rosen 1993, p. 99). As a
consequence, many contemporary Kantians use the names of the
many distinctions in various ways. However, if we concentrate on the
meaning and the function of the distinctions, the consensus is much
greater. In this spirit, we have concentrated our analysis on meaning
and function, while acknowledging that some people use different
names to refer these same meanings.
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world. Following philosophers preceding him, Kant finds a
solution in the idea of duties that primarily relate to the
(internal) quality of the moral agent’s decision-making
process. In particular cases, these duties do not demand
anything of the moral agent in terms of concrete, externally
visible actions. They only require them to consider the
quality of their decision-making process. Kant refers to this
kind of duty as ‘imperfect duty’ (Hill 2002; See also
Herman 1998, p. 169). An imperfect duty is a principle that
the agent must necessarily acknowledge as relevant in their
decision-making process (Kant 1797/1996, vol. VI,
pp. 382–384 and p. 393). ‘Beneficence’ is a core example
of an imperfect duty.
The old European idea that duties can either be perfect
or imperfect is another important restriction on the way in
which the duty may imply concrete actions and thus checks
overdemandingness. If overdemandingness is ever a prob-
lem, it must be in relation to perfect duties as they directly
relate to actions. Imperfect duties are duties in so far as we
are obliged to take a principle (i.e., ‘helping others’) into
account in our decision-making process. Unlike perfect
duties, imperfect duties do not necessarily oblige us to
prioritize the principle in our decision-making process
whenever it is judged that the duty applies. In Kantian
words: ‘the ends of others’ need not always be the ‘de-
termining maxim of action’ (Kant 1797/1996, vol. VI,
p. 393; See Hill 2002, p. 207). In each and every decision-
making process, there will be other relevant principles to
consider, including relevant self-regarding principles.
Taking the principle of beneficence into account may never
be overlooked (that mental, reflective activity is a duty) but
the principle does not necessarily trump all other relevant
considerations in specific instances and thus determines
concrete actions.
The idea that beneficence is an imperfect duty implies
that in no specific case other agents do have a title to
accuse an agent of wrongdoing as regards the duty of
beneficence. In the liberalist tradition, this is actually true
for two reasons. In a specific situation, it is simply never
wrong—after consideration—not to make the principle of
beneficence the determining principle of action. It is only
wrong to refuse to take into account the principle as such. It
is wrong to say: ‘I will live my life upholding the principle
that I will never make other agents’ happiness my con-
cern.’ The other reason is that the judgment about priori-
tizing the duty of beneficence is always to be made by the
agent themself. This follows from that fact that the duty of
beneficence is not owed to others. Hence, others never
have a title to claim that you were wrong.
The conceptualization of beneficence as an imperfect
duty implies that moral agents always have three options
while making a concrete judgment when confronted with a
MBS. Given that the agent is a rational moral agent, they
can (1) evaluate the situation as one in which there are
good and reasonable arguments to make the duty of
beneficence the ‘determining maxim of action’ and choose
an appropriate action accordingly. They can also (2)
evaluate the situation as one in which there are good and
reasonable arguments not to make the duty of beneficence
the ‘determining maxim of action’ and (3) evaluate the
situation as one in which there are good and reasonable
arguments to make the duty of beneficence the ‘determin-
ing principle’ yet still not act on these reasons. For both
option (1) and (2) it goes that not each and every agent will
come to the same exact conclusion, given the fact of moral
pluralism. For all these three options it holds that whatever
the agent decides in a particular case, it is never wrong.
What is more, other agents must accept that it is the agent
who has the authority to make the decision.
It is interesting to note that this account of beneficence
as an imperfect duty is in line with the intuitions of com-
mon morality. An example may illustrate this. When
somebody walks past a beggar they can decide to do
something (e.g., give money) or to do nothing. When the
agent prioritizes the duty of beneficence, they will do
something to help the beggar. When they do not give any
money, we do not typically condemn the agent as having
acted morally wrong. Common morality rejects the idea
that we must act on the duty of beneficence all the time.
Even in a case in which many people would think it
appropriate to give some money, there may be circum-
stances only known to the agent that may make the judg-
ment not to give any money, perfectly reasonable. Besides,
even if it were completely unreasonable not to give some
money, the decision lies with the agent and with nobody
else. Even in that case, we cannot say that the agent did
anything wrong in that specific situation.
Proponents of the overdemandingness argument may
claim that there are still too few restrictions on the duty.
The danger of overdemandingness is still not fully con-
tained. The imperfect structure may help against the idea
that an agent must always acknowledge a duty; it does not
help to counter the problem of overdemandingness once a
dutiful agent has established that the duty must be
acknowledged. Since today’s world is ridden by oMBS,
moral agents may still have to conclude that the duty
applies quite often. Hence, the danger of overdemanding-
ness still looms.
Kant’s taxonomy of (kinds of) duties can also rebut this
criticism by adding another distinction to the taxonomy of
duties; a distinction not overlapping with the distinction
between perfect and imperfect duties. Kant distinguishes
between duties in terms of the level of discretion agents
acquire when it comes to executing a moral duty, once it
has been established that it ought to be prioritized as
determining maxim of action. Some duties leave little
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leeway to the moral subject in how to make personal
decisions about executing them. The duty not to steal is an
example (albeit a duty that is clear on what the agent
cannot do). Other duties leave much more leeway in terms
of ‘when, what and how.’ Beneficence is a core example.
When confronted with a poor person, the moral agent may
give him some money or a lot of money. Moral agents are
also at liberty to decide to comfort him with a meal or
make a call to some welfare organization etc. Kant artic-
ulates this distinction in terms of discretion, by distin-
guishing ‘duties of narrow obligation’ and ‘duties of wider
obligation’ (Kant 1797/1996, vol. VI, pp. 390–393). This
distinction pertains to the level of discretion that agents
have in executing a duty in terms of when, what and how. It
is best looked upon as a scale with, at one pole, duties that
do not leave any discretion in terms of personally deciding
the ‘when, what and how’ (narrow obligation) and at the
other pole, duties that leave much leeway in these terms
(wider obligation). The duty of beneficence is a duty of
wider obligation. Hence, even when it is decided that the
duty must be prioritized, the overdemandingness problem
will not come about. Moral agents have personal discretion
in deciding on how to execute the duty, even if it is clear
that it ought to apply.
The Duty of Rescue
We have shown that the status of bystander can never
imply overdemandingness, if the ground of duty is benef-
icence. Beneficence contains mechanisms restricting the
consequences of the obligation in terms of concrete actions
agents must perform. Nevertheless, some authors think that
the best ground for the bystander status in relation to oMBS
must be the duty of rescue, in particular when we worry
about overdemandingness (Dunfee 2006; See also Scanlon
1998; Soule et al. 2009). In this section, we will briefly
characterize the duty of rescue as a ground for bystander
duties. In the next section, we intend to show that the duty
of rescue is not well suited to serve as ground for the
bystander status if we focus on oMBS.
The duty of rescue also is a bystander duty. Some of its
characteristics clearly expose it to the danger of leading to
overdemandingness in relation to oMBS. First, when an
agent must judge that the duty of rescue applies, help is
required. Acknowledgement in relation to a situation
implies action. The bystander to a person drowning in a
pool must help. Refraining from all action is wrong in such
a case. This means that the duty of rescue is a perfect duty;
actually one of the very few perfect duties that are not
structured as a duty of omission (i.e., ‘not do.’). This does
not mean that everybody has to do the same thing. The duty
is not strictly narrow. When it comes to executing the duty
there is some discretion. That is necessary, if only because
of practical circumstances. When you cannot swim, you
better not dive into the water to rescue a person. In these
circumstances, you had better alert somebody else. Second,
in case of rescue, the victim is at an immediate loss; not
helping will have grave consequences for that person.
Herman (1998) articulates this by saying that rescue
becomes operative when an agent´s ‘true needs’ are
endangered.
However, some of the characteristics of the duty of
rescue clearly put restrictions on the duty when we have to
acknowledge it in practice and must act on it. These
characteristics diminish the danger of overdemandingness.
First, in the case of the duty of rescue, it is much clearer
when one stops being a bystander. When the drowning
person is out of the water with a blanket on and the proper
authorities have arrived, the moral agent can go about their
own business again. Second, rescue is typically considered
to be restricted by the fact that the rescuer only has to make
a small sacrifice (Scanlon 1998). This is why rescuing a
person from a burning house is not dictated by the duty of
rescue.
The Duty of Rescue and oMBS
In this section, we intend to show that if bystander duties in
relation to oMBS are grounded on the duty of rescue, the
problem of overdemandingness can indeed not be fore-
closed. The duty of rescue has some restricting mecha-
nisms but these fail to avoid the problem. The restrictive
mechanisms are washed away by the enormity of the
problem facing the moral agent. We follow Tom Dunfee’s
discussion of the subject. The late Dunfee (2006) has tried
to ground the bystander status, in relation to oMBS on the
duty of rescue. Dunfee saw all to well that a full fledged
‘right to moral indifference’ as propagated by MMM ruins
the personal perspective. If such a right is given to com-
mercial agents, they can claim a right to be indifferent to
the worst of circumstances and still consider themselves to
be moral agents.
Yet, Dunfee was also well aware of the overdemand-
ingness problem. In other publications, he is one of the
authors that insists on the idea of MMM (Donaldson and
Dunfee 1999). This must be the reason why Dunfee spends
much time constructing his argument in such a way that the
charge can be averted. Because of all these counteracting
strategies, his argument for bystander status takes a form of
something that only applies ‘in rare cases’ (see also Soule
et al. 2009 for a similar kind of argument). We intend to
demonstrate that he failed, still.
Dunfee argued that when a ‘devastating catastrophe’
takes place, companies with ‘unique competencies’ have a
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‘mandatory moral obligation’ (2006, p. 187) to help.
Dunfee thinks that the AIDS epidemic is such a unique
case, especially when considering pharmaceutical compa-
nies as bystanders. According to Dunfee, rescue is the
proper ground exactly because this duty has to be
acknowledged in the worst of circumstances: when peo-
ple’s true needs are at stake. Dunfee constructs various
arguments to ‘‘defuse’’ the charge of overdemandingness
that he knows will be raised against his argument. As a first
step, Dunfee emphasizes that the (true) need must be
extremely great (2006, p. 187). We do not think that this is
a valid reason to limit the duty of rescue. When a person’s
true needs are violated, their circumstances are already
exceptional. It is non-sensical to create a category of ‘ex-
tra’ true needs. The requirement to help also cannot be
made conditional upon a quantitative criterion. As regards
true need, quantity does not count.
Another strategy used by Dunfee is to argue that the
market agent must be extremely well placed: they must be
‘uniquely positioned’ in terms of the relation to the oMBS.
Again, why does one only become a bystander if one is
uniquely positioned? The status of bystander is already
conditioned by the requirement that a set of symbolically
relevant criteria must apply. Morality is eroded by insisting
on more unique features. What is more, Dunfee seems to
suggest that moral agents are in a strange kind of compe-
tition, determining who is ‘most uniquely positioned.’ That
goes against the personal perspective presupposed by the
idea of a bystander. Each person must determine for
themselves whether they are a bystander, in relation to the
case at hand. (This does not mean that bystanders cannot
cooperate. It only means that the acknowledgement of the
status is a personal affair that must be undertaken irre-
spective of the considerations of others.) What is more,
Dunfee’s own core example is the relation between phar-
maceutical companies and the AIDS problem. How truly
exceptional is that relation? It is about a company having a
resource that some people truly need. In a world of scarcity
every company must have at least a few of these
relationships.
Dunfee argued that the relation must also be unique in
terms of the resources the bystander controls: ‘the core
competency of the firm must enable it to mitigate or alle-
viate the source or cause of the catastrophe’’ (Dunfee
2006, p. 188). Again, we must question whether this
attempt at restriction is valid. Dunfee again pushed for
more stringent criteria and suggested that there is strange
kind of competition going on between agents, now in terms
of resources. That is a misconception. Dunfee’s own
examples make this clear. In developing his case for res-
cue, Dunfee worked out a fictional case about a doctor
specialized in allergic reactions who visits a children’s
farm in his free time. This doctor gets accidentally
confronted with a bunch of children who have been stung
by bees. A few of them develop life-threatening allergic
reactions. In Dunfee’s scenario, this doctor happens to have
a bag full of medicines on them. Dunfee argued that in this
particular case, the doctor has a mandatory requirement to
help. He then argued that since the position of pharma-
ceutical companies vis-a-vis AIDS is comparable to the
position of the doctor, they also have a mandatory
requirement to help, grounded in the duty of rescue. Now,
we are not disputing that in these exceptional circum-
stances the doctor has a mandatory requirement to help.
Yet, we are disputing that all the other people present in the
children’s farm are not also mandatorily obliged. At least
some of them may also be well placed, on different but as
relevant criteria. Common morality would already find the
fact that someone is present at the scene to be symbolically
relevant. Because of that presence you should at least
check out whether you could be of some assistance (make
phone calls to parents, calming the children etc.).
As a last strategy suggested by Dunfee is that moral
agents must accept being submitted to a small voluntary
(pseudo) ‘tax’ based on a percentage of yearly profits. The
idea of such a voluntary tax seems to have been made with
the overdemandingness problem in mind: a small per-
centage of profits can never be overdemanding. The
problem with this solution is that the idea of an obligatory
annual gift is out of touch with the idea of being a
bystander on account of the duty of rescue. An agent who
has to acknowledge the duty of rescue asks themselves:
what is there to do here and now? It is also out of touch
with the personal perspective on morality presupposed by
the idea of a bystander. Given the personal perspective, it is
important to demonstrate the relation with direct, required
action that has to be performed, here and now. The tax has
nothing of that kind. It is more like an anonymous and
pseudo institutional solution broken free from the personal
perspective. One of the ways in which this shows is that it
is hard to argue why only ‘uniquely positioned’ bystanders
must pay this money. If it all comes down to paying
money, there is no rational for the requirement that the
bystander must be uniquely positioned.
The conclusion of this section must be that Dunfee
cannot avert the charge of overdemandingness. When
bystander status is grounded in the duty of rescue, the
problem of overdemandingness will arise. It should be
pointed out that the problem of most reasons is not that
they are impracticable. Some strategies fail because Dun-
fee’s attempt to define a ‘rare space’ for the duty of rescue
does not make sense. The delimitation between cases in
which agent would and would not become bystanders,
would become arbitrary while only inspired by a need to
define a rare space of application. An example is the
attempt to reduce the idea of ‘true need’ to ‘extremely great
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need.’ Other strategies fail because they are incompatible
with the nature of the duty of rescue and the personal
perspective on morality in which the duty makes sense. An
example is the idea of a voluntary ‘tax.’
Subjective Urgency
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate that MMM is
wrong when it argues that because of the problem of
overdemandingness, commercial agents must be granted a
right never to assume the status of bystander. Up to now,
we have shown that this argument fails if bystander status
is grounded in the duty of beneficence. We have also
shown that the charge makes sense if the duty of rescue is
considered the ground of the status. One way to save lib-
eralist thought would be simply to say that we should only
ground bystander status in relation to oMBS on the duty of
beneficence. But this would be a disappointing way of
going about. It seems that the duty of rescue is ousted as
ground on the basis of an arbitrary reason. In this section,
we therefore aim to show that there are structural reasons
foreclosing the possibility to ground bystander status in
relation to oMBS on the duty of rescue. An important
condition for the possibility of acknowledging the duty has
not been fulfilled: subjective urgency.
Agents only have to acknowledge a duty in practice
when particular conditions are fulfilled. A condition rele-
vant for the duty of rescue is for example ‘true need’ on the
side of the victim. We argue that within the liberalist
position, the duty of rescue only has to be acknowledged if
the condition ‘subjective urgency’ is fulfilled. The rele-
vance and meaning of this condition is often overlooked.
As a consequence of this, proponents of MMM argue that
liberalist thinking contains a problem that must be fixed by
granting commercial agents a right never to assume the
status of bystander. In reality, the duty of rescue does not at
all apply to situations in which a moral agent is confronted
with an oMBS.
Subjective urgency focusses on the position of the acting
agent; the agent who has to acknowledge the duty of res-
cue. Subjective urgency is the realization on the part of the
moral agent that they are the one who must act now. ‘If I do
not now take single, definitive steps, the moral badness will
come into full force.’ The drowning person will actually
drown, and the lethally stung children will actually die. In
all the examples, we have used (Dunfee’s included) sub-
jective urgency has always implicitly been taken into
account. Exactly because of subjective urgency, the doctor
and the good swimmer are called upon by the duty of
rescue. They can do something now.
As we see it, moral agents are not called upon as
bystanders by the duty of rescue in relation to oMBS,
exactly because the subjective urgency condition is not
fulfilled. The reason is somewhat paradoxical. An oMBS
defines a relation between the agent and a MBS. By defi-
nition, oMBS overwhelm the moral agent. There is not
really one thing the agent could do—here and now—that
would make a difference in terms of solving the problem.
Everything the agent could do, here and now, is mean-
ingless in terms of solving the problem. Here and now, the
agent cannot change much about the oMBS. The problem
is so big, the agent can only understand it through instan-
tiations. Exactly because of that, the subjective urgency
needed to make the duty of rescue operation vanishes.
Obviously, our argument must not be interpreted as
implying that when a moral agent is confronted with a
situation that they have good reason to interpret as the
instantiation of an oMBS, they require a right to do nothing
as that is meaningless. That is exactly what the protagonists
of MMM try to argue. The conclusion must be that if moral
agents have reason to interpret a situation as a confronta-
tion with an oMBS the duty of rescue does not apply but
they must consider themselves bystanders on account of
the duty of beneficence. (What that means in terms of
concrete actions is beyond the scope of this paper but it can
vary. If the duty of beneficence calls upon the agent to act,
some will focus on the real life case beyond the instanti-
ation and do something for these concrete victims. Others
will take the instantiation as a reason to put energy in long-
term improvements, like better law giving. All that belongs
to the discretion of the moral agent).
As yet, we have only explained the meaning of sub-
jective urgency. We have not clarified why that condition is
crucial to liberalist moral thought. Liberalist thinking
conceives of human beings as moral creatures; in the sense
that they are and must remain (i.e., improve as) moral
creatures (Kant 1788/1903; Herman 2007). As a conse-
quence, the personal perspective on morality cannot be
given up. It may even be its core. If the personal per-
spective is ever relevant, it must be in situations in which
the agent is confronted with the true needs of other moral
agents. Hence, liberalist thinking can never give up
bystander duties. That would not only ruin the perspective;
it would ruin morality as such. Hence, from a liberalist
perspective (and common morality for that matter), it
makes sense to assume that moral agents must have a duty
of rescue and to conceptualize this duty as perfect and
narrow. At the same time, it also makes sense to put strong
conditions on this crucial duty; otherwise it may inflate
quickly in a world in which there is so much bad. ‘Sub-
jective urgency’ is a condition that makes the duty mean-
ingful yet also limits it in a proper way.
Second, from the personal perspective, the meaning of
morality can never be ‘solving moral problems’ or ‘doing
away with the MBS one is confronted with.’ In a world of
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scarcity and all manner of other kinds of imperfections,
individual moral agents will probably always have to swim
in an ocean of MBS (see Fried 1978). Moral agents must do
their part to make institutions work but from the personal
perspective trying to relate in the right way to MBS can only
make sense if saving or upholding the moral agent’s own
status as moral agent (is part of) what it is all about. This is
articulated in the idea of ‘subjective urgency.’ It is not only
the other moral agent’s true need that hangs in the ballot; it is
(also) the moral agency of the bystander themselves.
Beneficence as a Meaningful Duty
Some may argue that we have indeed shown that benefi-
cence can be the ground of duty in relation to oMBS, but is
that duty to be taken seriously? If beneficence is ‘only’ an
imperfect duty and only of wider obligation on top of that,
does it really make a difference, especially in relation to
business agents working on the market? How seriously can
we take a duty that does not lead to wrongdoing in concrete
situations and that never gives others a title to accuse the
agent of anything? First thing to say is that even if
beneficence were a ‘weak’ duty, it would still be of enor-
mous value in opposing the belief that morality allows us to
behave in a ‘strictly business’ way. Those defending
unrestrained forms of capitalism sometimes argue that—
within minimum moral limits—business people are
allowed to be concerned only about the maximization of
profit in business. If beneficence is a duty, we can accuse
agents making this argument of committing the only pos-
sible wrong in relation to the duty of beneficence: to live by
the principle that one will (never) take the duty of benefi-
cence into account in one’s decision-making process. The
‘strictly business view’ denies that morality has a personal
dimension and is an immoral view, exactly because of that.
Second, there is a fundamental difference between
insisting that a moral agent has a right to decide on an issue
and saying that the agent is allowed to make any arbitrary
decision they like. Each agent has the right to make their
own decision but decisions are only right when they fulfill
certain criteria, i.e., are reasonable. If beneficence is to be a
duty, it must be. (.)… a serious, major, continually rele-
vant, life shaping end (Hill 2002, p. 206). This undercuts
the worry expressed by Dunfee (2006) and others that if
beneficence is merely an imperfect duty, commercial
agents have a moral right never to prioritize the duty or
have a moral right to argue that they have fulfilled the duty
of beneficence vis-a-vis the AIDS crisis by making a
donation to a local opera house. As moral agents, they
cannot do this.
Third, the fact that other agents do not have a title to
accuse the agent of wrongdoing in a particular case does
not mean that other agents must remain completely pas-
sive. As free moral agents they are morally allowed to
change their behavior toward another agent. Other agents
cannot punish an agent on account of the latter’s way of
dealing with the duty of beneficence but they can recon-
sider their relationship with the agent because of their own
view of life. In this indirect way, the non-beneficent agent
may experience bad consequences of their decisions. Moral
agents may not be allowed to say to a miser that they did
something wrong and therefore punish them. Still, they are
not required to remain friends with them either. By the
same token: even if a moral agent cannot accuse the non-
beneficent market agent of doing anything wrong, they may
decide to do their shopping elsewhere. The fact that moral
agents are not allowed to punish her does not mean that
they cannot freely decide to switch to another business
more in tune with their sense of morality.
Two comments rebutting the idea that beneficence is a
‘weak’ duty, have a more specific Kantian touch to them
but it may be interesting to spell them out. They show how
Kantian thought can be relevant in bolstering the impor-
tance of beneficence as an imperfect duty. Kantians oppose
the tendency within modern society in general, and busi-
ness ethics in particular, to reduce morality to a mechanism
to be used for social coordination and control (Wood
2002). Because of this reduction, the meaning of morality
comes close to legality—it only has a weaker means of
securing the compliance of moral agents. From a Kantian
point of view this misconceives morality. Ultimately,
morality concerns the process of becoming ‘‘one’s own
master’’ (Kant 1788/1903, vol. V, p. 33). It is about willing
to be, and willing to become, an agent who takes into
account certain (self-constraining) principles in their
decision-making process. Looking at beneficence from this
perspective beneficence is a core duty, exactly because it is
not supported by non-moral means of enforcement. In so
far as commercial agents will to be moral agents, they
cannot ignore this core duty.
Our next comment follows up on this. Kant (1797/1996,
vol. VI, p. 390) distinguishes between two kinds of moral
failing: that is, two ways in which a duty can be violated. In
so far as morality concerns violating the freedom of
another moral agent, violating a duty means acting morally
wrong. In so far as morality concerns the process of
becoming ‘autonomous,’ violating a duty is ‘merely non-
virtuous.’ When an agent wrongs others, the others gain a
title to blame and punish them. Merely non-virtuous
actions never give others that status. Others must regard
merely non-virtuous behavior as permissible in the broad-
est sense of that word. This state of affairs seems to make
‘merely non-virtuous actions’ a lesser kind of moral failing.
However, in so far as morality ultimately concerns attain-
ing autonomy, it is the worst kind of moral failing. Again,
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in so far as an agent will to be a moral agent, they must
take this duty seriously.
Conclusion
It has long been the common view within business ethics
that the morality of the market is a limited morality that
excludes all bystander duties. The idea of bystander duties
only makes sense from the personal perspective on
morality. In this paper, we investigated the argument that
bystander duties must be excluded because they imply
overdemandingness. This argument seems to make a lot of
sense in relation to oMBS and thus threatens the liberalist
position that tries to unite the moral agent’s right to an
ordinary life with bystander duties.
It is demonstrated in the paper that the overdemand-
ingness argument only makes sense if it is believed that
commercial agents who are confronted with an oMBS, are
obliged as bystanders by the duty of rescue. The argument
crumbles if the duty of beneficence is taken as the ground
of duty. Due to its structure, the duty of beneficence cannot
become overdemanding. Still, beneficence is a meaningful
and important duty. We have also shown that the duty of
rescue only has to be acknowledged if the condition of
subjective urgency is fulfilled. That is not the case when a
moral agent is confronted with an oMBS. Hence, the
charge of overdemandingness does not threaten the liber-
alist position. It also follows that the argument put forward
by protagonists of MMM fails. There is no moral right to
refute the status of bystander in relation to oMBS.
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